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DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL LAW
PROCEDURE
With the adoption of the federal rules of civil procedure by
the United States government and most states, pre-trial discovery
through depositions, interrogatories and conferences to prevent
surprise has become the rule rather than the exception in American
jurisprudence. On the other hand in ciminal prosecutions, where
some persons feel that the need for an adequate discovery pro-
cedure is greater than in civil matters, the discovery process is
very limited.
Discovery is the disclosure by the defendant of the facts,
titles, documents, or other things which are in his exclusive know-
ledge or possession, and which are necessary to the party seeking
the disclosure as a part of a cause of action pending or to be
brought in another court, or as evidence of his rights or title in
such proceedings.' Thus the defense or prosecution in a criminal
case may get information which must be confined to facts which
are material to the cause of action. The right of discovery is
limited to matter which is material and pertinent to the issue in
the case, and cannot be had for matter merely useful in supply-
ing a clue whereby evidence may be found for use in an antici-
pated case. 2 Discovery will not be granted to a plaintiff to enable
him to pry into the defendant's case or to find out the evidence
by which the case will be supported, but it may be granted even
though the materiality of evidence sought is not definitely es-
tablished. 3 This note will present a discussion of the opposing
views concerning development of discovery - a liberal discovery
procedure favored by defense attorneys whereby many things such
as confessions, lists of witnesses, grand jury proceedings and
tangible evidence will be available to the defense, or a restricted
discovery procedure, which is favored by the prosecution. This
note will also present the case for and against disclosure, discovery
1. BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1957).
2. Eastern States Corp. v. Eisler, 181 Md. 526, 80 A.2d. 867, 868 (1943), Bank v.
Bank, 180 Md. 254, 23 A.2d 700, 703 (1942).
3. Reynolds v. Boston & Maine Transp. Co., 98 N.H. 251, 98 A.2d 157 (1958).
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by both the prosecution and defendant and some implications for
reform.
Some courts view the main purposes of the rule authorizing
pretrial discovery procedure as permitting, prior to trial, the
narrowing of issues by elimination of matters not in controversy,
the securing of information such as the existence of evidence, and
the obtaining of evidence for use at the trial.4 To obtain discovery,
the defendant must show some better cause than a mere desire for
the benefit of all information which has been obtained by the
prosecution in their investigation of the crime. 5 For production
purposes, it need only appear that the evidence is relevant and
outside of any exclusionary rule.e
Under common law, no right for discovery existed.7  But sub-
sequent English cases established the contrary a century ago."
There may be inspection of a document where it is the subject or
the substance of the indictment, 9 and also if the object is such a
document or chattel as would require an investigation by experts
in order to bring the facts before the jury 10 On the other hand,
the defendant's privilege against self incrimination would prevent
inspection by the prosecution. 1 '
The prevailing law in the United States appears to be that four
kinds of disclosure are available in criminal trials. Defendants have
some rights to discovery of tangible evidence,'1 2 inspection of grand
jury nunutes'3 and lists of government witnesses. 14 The prosecution
in certain states can obtain notice of defenses of alibi 5 or insanity 1'
4. Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky 1954) , Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn.
547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
5. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.2d 775, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148, 157, 349 P.2d. 964, 973 (1960).
6. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953).
7. Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d. 838, 843 (8th cir. 1949) Rex v. Holland, 4 T.R.
692, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1792).
8. Regina v. Colucci, 3 Post & F 103, 176 Eng. Rep. 46 (1861) Rex v. Spry & Dore,
3 Cox C.C. 221 (1848) Rex v. Harrie, 6 Car. P 105, 172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (1833).
9. Regina v. Colucci, 3 Fost & P 103, 176 Eng. Rep. 46 (1861), Rex v. Harrie, 6
Car. P 105, 172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (1833).
10. Rex v. Spry & Dore, 3 Cox C.C. 221 (1848).
11. Rex v. Purnell, 1 Win. BI. 36, 96 Eng. Rep. 20- (1748).
12. State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 69, 51 A.2d 647, (Ct. of Appeals 1947) (written
confessions of the defendant) , Application of Hughes, 181 Misc. 668, 673, 41 N.Y.S.2d. 843,
847 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (Guns and bullets) , People v. Terzani, 149 Misc. 818, 269 N.Y.S.
620 (City. Ct. 1933) (finger prints on gun) State ex rel Wagner v. Circuit Court, 60
S.D. 115, 244 N.W 100 (1932) (Defendant indicted for defrauding county by overcharging
for construction of bridge, allowed to inspect field notes of county engineer).
13. IOWA CODE ANN. § 772.4 (1949) , Ky. CRIM. CODE TIT. 6 § 110 (Carroll 1948).
14. State ex. rel. Porter v. District court, 220 P.2d. 1035 (Mont 1950) Leahy v.
State, 111 Tex. Crim. 570, 585-589, 13 S.W.2d. 874, 881-882 (1928).
15. ARIZ. REv. STAT. Rule of Crlm. Proc. 192 (1956) IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1633
(1933) IOWA CODE § 777.18 (1962) KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1964) MICH. CODE OF
CRIM PRoc. Ch. 8, 768.20 (1948) MINN. STAT. ANN. § 630.1t (1946) N.Y. CODE CRI.
PROC. § 295L (1935) OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (Baldwin 1958) OKLA. STAT. ANN.
22 § 585 (1935) PA. STAT. ANN. R. of Crim. Proc. 312 (Supp. 1965) S.D. CODE § 34.2801
(Supp. 1960), UTAH CODE ANN. 77-22-17 (1953) VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13 § 6564 (1958),
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 955.07 (1959).
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Several states have attempted to codify discovery procedure by
enacting statutes.1
7
The power to require production of tangible evidence is gen-
erally assumed to exist in the discretion of the trial court,, but
in exercising their discretion, more courts have denied discovery
on the broad ground that the defendants should not be allowed to
pry into the prosecution's case. 9
Advance notice of opposing witnesses' testimony is probably
worth more to litigants than discovery of tangible evidence. In
criminal trials, however, it is generally available, if at all, only
through inspection of grand jury minutes;2 0 and such inspection
affords at best only partial discovery since the prosecution need
not present its entire case to the grand jury 21
At least two state statutes give the accused the right to inspect
grand jury minutes. 22  One jurisdiction rules that the defendant is
not entitled, as of right, to obtain a copy or examine the minutes
of the grand jury 23 In the federal courts, however, defendants
have generally been denied inspection under any circumstances. 2'
An important object of disclosure is to enable each side to
know the names of opposition witnesses. 25  Common law did not
16. ARIZ. REV. STAT. Rule of Crim. Proc. 192 (1956), ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1304
(Supp. 1961) CALIF. PEN. CODE § 1016 COLO. REv. STA.T. ANN. § 39-8-1 (1953), FLA.
STAT. § 909.17 (1963) GA. CODE § 27-1502 (1933), IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1701 (1933)
IOWA CODE § 777.18 (1962), LA. REV. STAT. § 15 268 (1950) , M . CRIM. PROC. RULE 725
(1957) MICH. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. Ch. 8, 768.21 (1948), OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 2943.03
(Baldwin, 1958), S.D. CODE § 34.20A01 (Supp. 1960), VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 6561
(1958) WIS. STAT. § 957.11 (1959).
17. ALASKA STAT. Crim R. 16, 17 (c) (1963) , FLA. STAT. § 925.04 (1963) , MD. CRIM.
PROC. R. 728 (1957) Mo. ANN. STAT. R. of Sur. Ct. Grim. Proc. R. 25.19 (1953) Pa.
STAT. ANN. R. of Crim. Proc. 310 (Supp. 1965) TEXAS R. CRIM. P Art. 39.14 (1966) W
VA. CODE ANN. § 6164 (S) (Supp. 1965).
18. Commonwealth v. Jordon, 207 Mass. 259, 265, 93 N.E. 809, 811 (1911), State v.
DiNol, 59 R.I. 348, 357, 195 AtI. 497, 501 (1937).
19. State v. Superior Ct. of Santa Cruz County, 81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d. 263 (1956)
People v. Skoyec, 183 Misc. 764, 50 N.Y.S.2d. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
20. McAden v. State, 155 Fla. 523, 31 So.2d. 33 (1945), Poyner v. Commonwealth,
274 Ky. 813, 120 S.W.2d. 649 (Ct. App. 1938).
21. The prosecutor need present only enough evidence to satisfy statutory requirements
for bringing of indictments. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.03 (1947) provides the grand jury
shall find an indictment when all the evidence taken together is such as in its judgment,
would, if unexplained or uncontradicted warrant a conviction by a trial jury. N.D. CENT.
CODE 29-10-39 (1960) provides the grand jurors shall find an indictment charging the
defendant with the commission of an offense when all the evidence before them, taken
together, is such as in their judgment would warrant a conviction by the trial jury.
22. Supra note 13 Most states have statutes requiring secrecy of grand jury
proceedings e. g. N.D. CENT. CODE 29-10-29 (1960) "Every member of a grand jury must
keep secret whatever he himself or any other grand juror may have said, or in what
matter he or any other grand juror may have voted on a matter before the jurors"
23. Commonwealth v. Baliro, 209 N.E.2d. 308, 316 (Mass. 1965) Commonwealth v.
Galvin, 323 Mass. 211, 215, 80 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1948) It was within the discretion of the
court of grant or refuse the motion for grand jury minutes.
24. United States v. Gonzalez, 38 F.R.D. 326, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) s. g. United
States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (per L. Hand, J. "Inspection is
said to lie in discretion, and perhaps it does, but no judge of this court has granted it,
and I hope none ever will.").
25. State ex rel. Porter v. District Court 220 P.2d 1035 (Mont. 1950) Leahy v. State,
111 Tex. Crim. 570, 585-589, 130 S.W.2d 874, 881-882 (1928).
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require the state to furnish defendant in the indictment, in the
information, or elsewhere with the names of its witnesses. 26 In
most states, by case law or statute, the names of all the witnesses
on whose evidence the indictment or information was based shall
be endorsed thereon before it is presented. 21 Even a list require-
ment covering all witnesses which the prosecution intends to produce
at trial does not necessarily prevent the production of new witnesses.
Generally, the prosecutor can produce unlisted witnesses if he did
not know of them when he submitted his list to the defendant.28 In
addition, witnesses can usually be called in rebuttal without prior
notice.
29
A form of disclosure especially important to prosecutors is
advance notice of the theory of the defendant's case. While the
state must reveal m the indictment or information the nature of
its charge against an accused, under common law the defendant
need give no notice of his defense in his plea of "not guilty "
Ordinarily, such defenses as entrapment, alibi, self-defense and
insanity may be offered at the trial without prior warning.
30
A number of states, North Dakota not being among them, have
changed the common law rule by enacting statutes requiring
defendants to plead specially, defenses of alibi s' or insanity 
S
2
This gives notice of the defenses to be relied on and saves the
state expense in preparing its case since it knows for what it has
to prepare. The purpose of the alibi statutes was to prevent a
defendant from obtaining acquittal of a crime of which he was
guilty by calling a number of witnesses to testify to a false alibi
with no prior opportunity afforded to the District Attorney to make
any investigation of them or their story S3 If the defense is not
pleaded the court may exclude evidence tending to prove it. 4 The
statutes have been construed, however, to permit the defendant to
establish a defense anytime by his own testimony 85 The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure contain no provision for disclosure of
defenses.
26. State v. Daspit, 129 I. 752, 56 So. 661 (1911).
27. E. g., N. D. CENT. CODE 29-11-57 (1960).
28. N.D. CENT. CODE 29-11-57, (1960) , State v. Grams, 65 N.D. 400, 259 N.W 86
(1935) See People v. Weisberg, 396 Ill. 412, 71 N.E.2d. 671 (1947).
29. Watkins v. People, 408 P.2d 425 (Colo. 1965), Schreiner v. People, 95 Colo. 392,
36 P.2d. 764 (1934).
30. Romero v. Squier, 133 F.2d. 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1933) (Entrapment) , Shields
v. State, 221 Ala. 321, 128 So. 786 (1930) (Self-defense) Leonard v. State, 17 Ariz.
293, 299, 151 Pac. 947, 949 (1915) (Alibi).
31. Supra note 15.
32. Supra note 16.
33. People v. Raklec, 289 N.Y. 306, 45 N.E.2d. 812 (Ct. App. 1942).
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DISCOVERY IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
While it often is assumed that there was no discovery in the
federal courts before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the cases reveal that discovery was sometimes granted.
In perhaps the first case on the subject, Chief Justice Marshall,
sitting as a circuit Justice, upheld a subpoena duces tecum issued
to the President of the United States directing him to bring any
paper of which the party praying has a right to avail himself as
testimony 36 He stated that "Such motion for subpoena duces tecum
is to the discretion of the court."
'
7
Apparently no decisions involving discovery were rendered in
reported decisions for more than a century following Marshall's
precedent-setting decision. In 1918 the discovery procedure was
extended to bankruptcy proceedings. It was held that in the course
of an investigation into a bankrupt's affairs, under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, the testimony of witnesses was taken stenographically
before a referee and the bankrupt was entitled to a copy of the
testimony 3 The court pointed out that the proceedings might
result in contempt and criminal proceedings against the bankrupt.39
A case frequently cited by opponents of discovery is United
States v Garsson.40 In respect to discovery the case held that a
motion by a defendant to inspect the minutes of the grand jury
should be denied, and District Judge Learned Hand condemned such
motions in strong language.
41
A defendant charged with perjury on the basis of testimony
given before a representative of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission applied for an order directing that the defendant be
furnished with a copy of testimony taken at an investigation made
by the commission through its representatives. The federal district
court denied the application.4 2 The court concluded that the copy
of the testimony would be of no help to the defendant in his trial
and that the defendant could have a fair trial without it. The
34. E. g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 630.14 (1946).
35. Supra note 33.
36. United States v. Burr., 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D.Va. 1807) "The court has
no right to refuse its aid to motions for papers to which the accused may be entitled, and
which may be material to his defense An accused person has the right, before
indictment found, to compel, by ways of precaution, the production of letters containing
statements of his conduct written by the person who is declared to be the essential
witness against him. And in such case he is entitled to the production of the original
letter, a copy not being sufficient."
37. Ibid.
38. In re Greenbaum, 249 Fed. 468 (6th Cir. 1918).
39. In re Greenbaum, supra, note 38.
40. 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
41. Infra, note 70.
42. United States V. Mascuch, 30 F Supp. 976, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
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defendant argued that the court had discretionary power to grant
discovery The court did not deny that it had discretionary power,
but added that there was no absolute right to discovery The burden
of showing good reason for inspection is on the defendant, and the
government need not show disadvantage.
43
In the first Supreme Court decision to touch on discovery, the
court did not reject the right to discovery in criminal cases.4
Defendant's plea at bar claimed immunity from prosecution because
of prior incriminating testimony given under compulsion by the
petitioner at an investigation conducted by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. The plea was accompanied by an application
for production of a transcript of the testimony The Court held that
the district court had erred in not ordering production, but whether
the complete transcript should have been produced or only enough
to show whether the testimony of the defendant was a proper foun-
dation for amnesty claimed, was in the discretion of the district
court.
4 5
In the last federal decision prior to the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, it was held the defendant was
entitled to inspection of the contents of a package containing a
threatening letter alleged to have been sent through the mails.
46
On the facts there was no danger of tampering with witnesses or
fabrication of evidence by the defendant. Refusal of inspection would
probably produce delays during the trial.
Rule 16 of the Federal Criminal Rules, entitled "Discovery and
Inspection," provides the following:
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing
of the indictment of information, the court may order the
attorney for the government to permit the defendant to in-
spect and copy or photograph designated books, paper, docu-
ments, or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to
the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by
process, upon a showing that the items sought may be
material to the preparation of his defense and that the re-
quest is reasonable. The order shall specify the time,
places and manner of making the inspection and of taking the
copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just.4 7
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure affords the
43. Ibid.
44. Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941).
45. Ibid.
46. United States v. Warren, 53 F. Supp. 435, 436 (D. Conn. 1944).
47. 18 U.S.C., Fed. R. Crnm. P 16, App. (1964).
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defendant limited right to pre-trial inspection for the purpose of
discovery Since the rule provides that the court "may" rather
than that the court "shall" direct inspection, the court has dis-
cretion to deny inspection on grounds not specified in the rule.48
In the only Supreme Court decision construing Rule 16,4 Justice
Minton stated for the Court:
It was intended by the rules to give some measure of dis-
covery Rule 16 was adopted for that purpose. It gave
discovery as to documents and other materials otherwise
beyond the reach of the defendant which, as in the instant
case, might be numerous and difficult to identify The Rule
was to apply not only to documents and other materials
belonging to the defendant, but also to those belonging to
others which had been obtained by seizure or process. This
was a departure from what had theretofore been allowed in
criminal cases.
Rule 16 deals with documents and other materials that are
in possession of the Government and provides how they
may be made available to the defendant for his information.
In the interest of orderly procedure in the custody of the
Government accumulated in the course of an investigation
and subpoenaed for use before the grand jury and on the
trial, it was provided by Rule 16 that the court could order
such materials made available to the defendant for inspec-
tion and copying or photographing. In that way, the control
and possession of the Government is not disturbed. Rule
16 provides the only way the defendant can reach such ma-
terials so as to inform himself.Y°
The importance of this case rests in its statement of the in-
tention and application of Rule 16. The case points out that Rule 16
deals with documents and other materials that are in possession of
the Government and provides how they may be available to the
defendant for his information.
The only language of the rule which has received any degree
of explicit construction is the requirement that the designated
materials be "obtained from" the defendant. In United States v
Black,51 however, statements made by the defendant to Government
agents were held outside the coverage of Rule 16, on the ground
that the rule applied only to those documents and objects which
were in existence and in the custody of a defendant or other person
prior to the government's obtainment of them by process or seizure.
48. United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F Supp. 405 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
49. Bowman Dairy v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 218 (1951).
50. Ibd.
51. 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946).
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It follows that any statement made to government agents after the
commission of the alleged crime are excluded from inspection under
the rule.
2
Rule 17 (C) entitled "For Production of Documentary Evidence
and of Objects" provides:
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is
directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or other
objects designated therein. The court on motion made
promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance
would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct
that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the
subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to
the trial or evidence and may upon their production permit
the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof
to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.5 3
The wording of this rule does not contain the express limitations
upon the source of the documents and papers or the manner in
which they were obtained that exist under Rule 16. But, as the
Supreme Court made clear in Bowman Dairy Co. v United States,54
Rule 17 was not intended to give a right of discovery in the broadest
terms or to authorize a "fishing expedition." Its chief innovation
was to expediate the trial for the inspection of the subpoenaed
materials.5 5
An additional element of discretion may be found in the pro-
vision of Rule 17 (C) which allows, but does not require, pre-trial
inspection. It is pointed out that whether materials subject to
subpoena are to be produced and inspected prior to trial rests within
the sound discretion of the court.56 Thus, before granting a, motion
for pre-trial inspection under Rule 17 (C), the trial court should
exercise its discretion to require some showing of specificity,
materiality, and pre-trial necessity, the defendant can inspect under
Rule 17 (C) materials which might not be available to him under
Rule 16, such as his statements or confessions, those of other persons,
and materials given to or prepared by the government.
Three arguments may be advanced in favor of granting dis-
covery not specifically authorized by Rules 16 and 17 (C) They
52. Ibid.
53. 18 U.S.C., Fed. R. Crim. P 17 (C), App. (1964).
54. Supra note 49.
55. Supra note 49 It was not intended by Rule 16 to give a limited right of discovery,
and then by Rule 17 to give a right of discovery in the broadest terms. Rule 17 (C) Was
not intended to provide an additional means of discovery.
56. United States v. Janizzlo, 22 F.RILD. 223, 227 (D. Ct. Del 1958), United States v.
Ward, 120 F Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.y. 1954), United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F Supp.
405 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
340
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are: (1) court's inherent power, (2) court's supervisory power over
public officers, (3) Criminal Rule 57 (b)
In the first place a court has inherent power to order discovery
As early as 1927 it was asserted that only a minority of the state
courts deny inherent power to order discovery 57 In later years, it
was pointed out that the "majority of states, although without
statute or rule of court on the subject, allow discovery m criminal
cases at the discretion of the trial court.' 15  The doctrine of inherent
power was applied in a decision of the Court of Appeals of the
Eighth circuit. 59 The Supreme Court has also relied on the doc-
trine of inherent power in a case where the United States attorney
was unwilling to return books and papers acquired by illegal search
and seizure.60
In the second place the courts have supervisory powers over
public officers. This is based on a 1927 statement by Chief Justice
Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals.6s "The power frequently
asserted to compel the return of property illegally impounded is
based upon the assumption of a supervisory jurisdiction over the
acts of public prosecutors. There may be something of a kin-
ship here to the power to compel inspection in furtherance of
justice.1
6 2
In the third place, discovery may be available under Criminal
Rule 57 (B) 83 This rule seems to empower the courts to follow
common law precedents not written into the rules and to preserve
the inherent power of the courts to develop the law An example
of this is that the rules are silent as to inspection of documents
during the trial. Before the adoption of the rules, the court granted
motions for inspection at the trial.64 After the rules went into effect
the Supreme Court held erroneous the denial of a motion for pro-
duction and inspection at the trial.65
CASE FOR AND AGAINST EXPANDING DISCOVERY
The major argument against criminal discovery is that, instead
57. People v. Gatti, 167 Misc. 545, 4 N.Y.S.2d. 130 (City Ct. 1938) People ex rel
Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
58. State v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d. 263 (1956)
This case is very significant as Arizona had a rule of court modeled on Federal Rule 16,
yet relief was given on the theory of Inherent power. People v. Skoyec, 183 Misc. 764, 50
N.Y.S.2d. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
59. Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d. 838, 843 (8th Cir. 1949).
60. Wise v. Henkel, 220 U.S. 556, 558 (1911).
61. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, supra note 57, See also Wise v. Henkel,
Supra note 60.
62. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, supra note 57 at 85.
63. 18 U.S.C., Fed R. Crim. P 57 (b) app. (1964). "If no procedure is specially
prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these
rules or with any applicable statute."
64. United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d. 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1944).
65. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 418 (1953).
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of aiding, it would deter accurate fact-finding. Advance discovery,
it is said, gives defendants the opportunity to falsify and suppress
evidence.6 6 The criminal, if he knows the case against him, will
procure perjured testimony to establish a false defense. 67 In addition,
the argument continues, the accused, if informed of adverse wit-
nesses' testimony, may cajole, bribe, or frighten them into changing
their stories.6 Such misuse of discovery is more likely in criminal
than m civil cases, because litigants have a much higher stake in
the outcome, and their actions may keep witnesses from coming
forward with information during investigation of the crime.69
Another major argument is that the prosecution is at a dis-
advantage. It begins with the premise that criminal procedure is
weighted in favor of the accused, and concludes that it would be
unjust to the public to give the defendants the additional help of
discovery In a leading case against discovery, 70 Judge Hand stated
the argument:
Under our criminal procedure, the accused has every ad-
vantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge,
he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is
immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot
be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds
of any one of the Twelve. Why, m addition, he should in
advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over
at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have
never been able to see. No doubt grand juries err and in-
dictments are calamities to honest men, but we must work
with human beings and we can correct such errors only at
too large a price. Our dangers do not lie in too little tender-
ness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted
by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and




In civil litigation parties are on an equal footing, but in crm-
inal trials such rules as the presumption of innocence give the
accused all the advantages. In the Rhoads case it was stated that
"in these days, criminals are both skilled and cunning, and it is a
contest between the people and criminals for the mastery -72
66. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d. 881, 884 (1953), State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St.
397, 423-4, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910), See generally Symposia, 33 F.1R.D. 47, (1964).
67. Supra note 66.
68. Supra note 66.
69. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d. 881, 884 (1953) People v. DiCarlo, 161 Misc.
484, 485, 486, 292 N.Y. Supp. 252, 254 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
70. United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
71. Ibid.
72. United States v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 423, 424, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910).
342
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Moreover, while both sides must disclose their evidence in civil
trials, this element of reciprocity is lacking in criminal cases;
because of the accused's constitutional and statutory protections
against self-incrimination, the state has no right whatsoever to de-
mand an inspection of any of his documents or to take his depo-
sition, or to submit interrogatories. As stated in a leading case
which dealt with lack of reciprocity 73
The state cannot compel the prisoner at the bar to submit
his private papers or memoranda to the state for use or
even examination, for he cannot be required to testify in
the case, nor to furnish evidence against himself. Then, why
should the accused be allowed to rummage through the
private papers of the prosecuting attorney) Neither the sub-
lime teachings of the Golden Rule, to which we have been
referred, nor the supposed sense of fair play, can be pervert-
ed as to sanction the demands allowed in this case.7 4
It has been pointed out that the right to discovery exists in
civil cases, therefore, it should exist in criminal cases.7 5 There
is a vast difference between a civil and criminal case in that while
both are a search for the truth, there is no mutual exchange of
information in a criminal case as exists in a civil case. In a
criminal case there is a one-sided search for the truth and there
can be no equal exchange of information due to the very nature
of the proceedings. This nature is simply that very little discovery
is allowed by both parties in a criminal case.
Unfair disadvantage is advanced by the defense as an argument
for not requiring the defendant to serve notice of special defenses
such as insanity or alibi. This argument has been losing ground
as evidenced by the fact that many states are passing statutes
requiring notice .7
Increased reliance upon the trial as the principal device for
protecting the accused makes it imperative that the defense come
73. Ibid.
74. Supra note 72 See State v. Bunk, 63 A.2d 842, (N.J. City. Ct. 1949) "The element
of reciprocity Is present in the conduct of civil cases. Each party may examine the other,
force disclosure of material evidence and thus reduce to a minimum the element of surprise
or chance in the trial In criminal causes no such reciprocity is possible. The State could
not examine the defendant before trial without his consent, nor could any rule of court
force such examination."
State v. Tune, supra note 66 , This case ties in with the above two cases by stating:
"Except for its right to demand particulars from the defendant as to any alibi on which he
intends to rely, the State is completely at the mercy of the defendant who can produce
surprise evidence at the trial, can take the stand or not as he wishes, and generally can
introduce any sort of unforseeabe evidence he desires in his own defence. To allow him to
discover the prosecutor's whole case against him would be to make the prosecutor's task
almost insurmountable."
75. State v. Trlppett, 317 Mo. 319, 296 S.W. 132, 135 (1927).
76. See notes 15 (alibi) and 16 (Insanity).
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to trial as well equipped as the prosecution to raise "doubt in the
minds of any one of the twelve" men in the jury box.77 Particularly
in a system based, as is ours, upon a single trial held on a single
occasion, the parties must come to trial prepared to make the
most of their presentation on that occasion in their search for the
truth.
A criminal prosecution should not be treated as a game. 78 That
is to say, artificial barriers should not be erected to make it more
difficult for a defendant to prove his innocence. It is the duty of
the government to give all possible protection to the innocent as
well as to to punish the guilty 79 The defendant is entitled to have
every opportunity to prove his defense. 0 Perhaps the principal
argument is that discovery is necessary to help the defendant
prepare his case.
8 1
The principal role of an attorney is to advise his client. For
his advice to be meaningful, it must be based upon knowledge of
the facts and the consequences. One of these consequences is the
probability of conviction if the client goes to trial. It may be im-
possible for counsel to make any intelligent evaluation of the
alternatives if he knows only what his client has told him and what
he has discovered on his own. This can be effectively shown by the
recent Supreme Court decision which provides that the accused
must be informed of constitutional privilege against self-incrimin-
ation and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires.12 This decision may be
important to discovery procedure as it allows the accused's attorney
to be present during the questioning. The attorney has immediately
any statements that the accused may make.
The argument is sometimes made that discovery will encourage
the defense counsel to be careless in trial preparation. This argu-
ment was refuted by a recent case which stated that: "Requiring
government disclosure will not encourage defense counsel to be
careless in trial preparation since there can be no assurance that
77. United States v. Garsson, supra note 70.
78. State v. Tune, 17 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 894-895 (1953), dissent by Brennan, J.,
See generally Symposia, 33 F.R.D. 47, 82 (1964).
79. United States v. Ebiling, 146 F.2d. 254, 258 (2d. Cir. 1944) , State v. Tune, supra
note 78, dissenting opinion of Brennan, J. Canon 5 of Professional Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association provides: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public pro-
secution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible."
80. United States v. Rich, 6 Alaska 670 (3rd Div. 1922).
81. Supra note 80.
82. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 479 (1966), Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964).
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the government, even with all its resources, will discover all sig-
nificant evidence favorable to the defense. '",
The argument is made that the defendant needs no disclosure
since he knows what he did, and, therefore, has all the information
necessary This argument lacks sincerity because only guilty
defendants could know the facts and details of the crime. Presumed
to be innocent rather than guilty, it must be assumed "that he is
ignorant of the facts on which the pleader founds his charges."8 5
In having discovery for the defendant, the prosecution should
disclose any evidence that may reasonably be considered admissible
and useful to the defense. When there is substantial room for
doubt as to the prosecution's duty to disclose evidence that may
reasonably be considered admissible and useful to defense, the
prosecution is not to decide for the court what is admissible or
for the defense what is useful.8 6  Discovery is designed to ascertain
the truth in criminal as well as in civil cases. 7  Absent some
governmental requirement that information be kept confidental for
the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest
in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light
on issues in the case. 8 To deny flatly any right of production on
the ground that an imbalance would be created between the ad-
vantages of prosecution and defense would be to lose sight of the
true purpose of a criminal trial, the ascertainment of the facts. 9
Just as the State may have a legitimate interest in keeping
confidential certain information "for the purpose of effective law
enforcement," it may also in special circumstances have cogent
reasons for keeping confidential - in order to give some assurance
83. Levin v. Katzenbach, 34 U.S.L. Week 2652 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 1966).
84. United States v. Smith, 16 F.R.D. 372, 375 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
85. Supra note 84 United States v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 42 F Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) Fontana v. United States, 262 F. 283, 286 (C.A. 8th Cir. 1919).
86. Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d. 842, 845 (4th Cir. 1964),
Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C.Cir. 1950) , Judge Edgerton stated the
role of prosecutor is to uphold justice, not to win a case. "The United States Attorney is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation at aU, and whose interest,
therefore, In a criminal prosecution is not that It should win a case, but that justice shall
be done."
87. Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 58 Cal.2d. 56, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 372
P.2d. 919, 920 (1962) , See Greyhound Corp v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d. 355, 15 Cal. Rptr.
90, 364 P.2d 266 (1961).
88. Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County, supra note 87 Powell v. Superior
Court, 48 Cal.2d. 704, 312 P.2d. 698, 699 (1957), When the Supreme Court first granted
the defendant the right to pretrial discovery, it referred to the broad basis of discovery
announced in Riser and added. "To deny inspection of defendant's statements would
likewise be to lose sight of the objective of ascertainment of the facts, and would be out of
harmony with the policy of this state that the goal of criminal prosecutions is not to secure
a conviction in every case by any expedient means, however odious, but rather only
through the truth upon a public trial fair to the defendant and the state alike." People v.
Riser, 47 Cal.2d. 566, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956), Defendant can compel the People to produce
statements of prospective witnesses relating to matters covered In their testimony.
89. Ibid.
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that the truth can be presented - the names of prospective
witnesses. In a California case, People v Lopez, 0 the defendant,
a previously convicted criminal, was refused immediate disclosure
of the State's witnesses' names. Two witnesses informed police that
they were "in fear of physical injury or death and they would not
like anyone to know who they are." The court concluded that
there must be a balancing of the right of a defendant to discover
potentially material witnesses with the probability that such dis-
covery might lead to the elimination of an adverse witness or the
influencing of his testimony In balancing these competing factors
the trial court must be allowed great discretion. The State was
ordered to produce the information at least twenty-four hours prior
to the time the subject witnesses were to be called.9 2
Practical discovery by the prosecution is far reaching, and it
cannot in any sense be matched by what is available to the defendant
or by what he can keep from the prosecution even when his im-
munity from self-incrimination is thrown into the scales. While the
possibility that the defendant may produce a hitherto undisclosed
witness or theory of defense is always present, the opportunity for
surprise is rendered practically illusory by the government's broad
investigatory powers and by the requirement m many states that
the defenses of alibi and insanity be specially pleaded.9 3
California, which is the leader of the states in advancing dis-
covery, also provides that pre-trial discovery should not be a one-
way street. The Supreme Court of California94 upheld that portion
of a trial court's order which required the defendant in a rape
case to reveal the names and addresses of the witnesses he in-
tended to call and to produce before trial reports and x-rays he
intended to introduce in evidence to support his defense of impotence.
The court concluded that, absent the privilege against self-incrim-
ination or other privilege provided by law, the defendant in a
criminal case has no valid interest in denying the prosecution access
by discovery procedures to evidence that can throw light on issues
in the case. 5
The most striking aspect of these cases is that the principal
initiators of change have been trial court judges. 96 The trial judge
90. 32. Cal. Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d. 16, 29 (1963).
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. See notes 15 (alibi) and 16 (insanity).
94. Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County, supra note 87.
95. Ibid.
96. State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954), State
v. Ha"s, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647 (Ct. of Appeals 1947), State ex rel. Sadler v. Lackey,
319 P.2d. 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957), State v. Thompson, 338 P.24, 319 (Wash. 1959).
97. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d. 881 (1953).
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is more likely to appreciate the policy factors behind granting or
denying discovery He sees cases at the formative stage where the
advantages of discovery techniques in civil cases are most striking,
he sees the burden on the defense counsel in criminal cases prior
to trial, and he sees the ignorance of defendants entering a guilty
plea. He is able realistically to determine the relative advantages
each side will have with or without discovery He also knows
personally the attorneys appearing before him with such requests
and is able to appraise their integrity and trustworthiness in using
information derived from the prosecutor's case.
In ordering discovery, the trial courts have acted on a long
standing invitation issued by the appellate court that it is within
the discretion of the trial court to grant or deny requests for dis-
covery This is not necessarily true all the time as is shown by
a New Jersey case 7 where the appellate court ruled on discovery
In that case the trial court did exercise its discretion and granted
discovery, but was reversed by the Supreme Court. In 1958 the
New Jersey court reversed its stand in State v Johnson.9s In
that case the trial court had been impressed with the decision in
the Tune case. 99 The appellate court, largely because of changes
in personnel between 1953 and 1958, did not cling to its restrictive
view of discovery, but changed its approach and provided a liberal
basis upon which discovery of a confession could be obtained. 100
In California, the most liberal in providing pre-trial discovery,
the change has also come through the appellate courts starting with
Powell v Superior Court, rather than through the trial courts. 10 1
If a procedural system is to be fair and just, it must give each
of the participants to a dispute the opportunity to sustain his position.
It must not create conditions which add to any essential inequality
of position between the parties, but rather must assure that such
inequality will be minimized as much as human ingenuity can do so.
A possible solution is the creation of a free deposition and dis-
covery procedurelo2 This would afford the accused the ability to
draw upon all that the prosecution has gathered, compensating in
part for all that the prosecution has learned from the accused and
his witnesses. If the trial is to be the occasion at which well-pre-
pared adversaries test each other's evidence and legal contentions
98. 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d. 313 (1958).
99. Supra note 97.
100. Supra note 98, Defendant previously couldn't inspect his own previous statements
but the court provided defendant could inspect statements.
101. See Cal.2d. 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957).
102. See generally, Goldstein, Advantages in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L. T., 1149
1192 (1960).
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in the best tradition of the adversary system, there can be no
substitute for a deposition, discovery, and pre-trial procedure.
The argument customarily advanced in opposition to such a re-
form is that advice to the accused as to details of the case against
him will be an invitation to fabricate evidence, to suborn others to
do so, or to intimidate the witnesses against him. 03 This argument
assumes that all persons are guilty, and since they expect to be
convicted for what they did, they can be expected to take any
measure necessary to prevent conviction. This view treats existing
laws against bribing and intimidating witnesses as ineffective.
If full discovery were adopted, it would be open to the prose-
cution to claim that it would not have as much access to the
defendant himself as he would have all the prosecution's witnesses.
Three responses may be made to this line of argument.104
The first would allow the defendant his immunity as a mark
of the maturity of our state and the consummate respect it pays
to the dignity of the individual. This would be both for his own
sake and for the benefit of society seeking to impress upon police
and prosecutors the high obligation to proceed against a citizen only
when they have independent evidence of his crime.
The second would demand of the accused who wishes to par-
ticipate in an intelligent procedural system that he pay a price for
such participation. This would involve a waiver of his special
status as an accused, though not his status as witness in return for
full rights of discovery because he would still have the privilege
of the witness to refuse to answer particular incriminating questions.
The third would be as a condition of enjoying full rights of
discovery, the accused could be required to waive all immunity from
self-incrimination regarding the crime charged, at the time he enters
his plea of not guilty He would then become as much subject to
deposition, discovery and testimony at trial as is any witness in a
civil case. The choice would be his to make - to participate in
either a criminal or a civil type procedural system.
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROPOSALS
The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules appointed by the
Chief Justice of the United States under the program of the Judicial
Conference of the United States submitted in December of 1962 a
draft of proposed amendments to certain of the Federal Rules of
103. See notes 66, 69, and 70.
104. Supra note 102, 1197-1198.
105. 31 F.R.D. 665-694 (1962).
106. 34 F.R.D. 411, 418-426 (1965).
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Criminal Procedure. 5 In March of 1964, a new draft"O was sub-
mitted which supersedes the 1962 draft. It withdrew some of the
proposals made, changed the language of others, and added a number
of new proposals not previously made public.
The committee withdrew its earlier proposal requiring defendants
to give advance notice if they intended to rely on an alibi. The
committee proposed m Rule 12.1, that notice be given by a defendant
who intends to rely on the defense of insanity The special nature
of the insanity defense, with the expert testimony required to com-
bat it, lends merit to this proposal.
Rule 15 would be amended to permit depositions to be taken
at the instance of the government. A new subdivision (G) would
be added to provide protection for the defendant where this pro-
cedure is employed.
Rule 16 would be changed m many ways. Subdivision (A) would
extend discovery to confessions of the defendant, the reports of
physical examinations, scientific tests and the like, and to recorded
testimony of the defendant before a grand jury Though the court
would apparently have discretion whether to permit such discovery,
no standard is stated which the defendant must satisfy Subdivision
(B) would permit inspection by the defendant of other documents
or tangible objects in the possession or control of the government
subject to the limitations of the Jencks Act1°7 and subject to a
showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation
of the defense and that the request is reasonable. Subdivisions (D)
through (G) would spell out procedure for discovery in a manner
similiar to that familiar under the civil Rules.
Subdivision 16 (C) would provide that if the court grants dis-
covery sought by the defendant under Rule 16, it may condition its
order by requiring the defendant to permit inspection by the gov-
ernment of statements, scientific, or medical reports, documents,
and other tangible objects, which the defendant intends to produce
at the trial and which are within his possession or control. In a
Committee Note, an alternative draft of Rule 16 (C) is set forth
which would allow discovery by the government of matter which
the defendant intends to produce at the trial regardless of whether
the defendant has himself sought discovery Proposed Rule 17.1
would permit pre-trial conferences in criminal cases.
Naturally these proposals raise some questions of constitution-
107. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States
a statement made by a government witness (other than the defendant) to an agent of
the Government shall not be subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said
witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ality, especially in terms of the privilege against self-incrimination.
With respect to the proposal which conditions the government's right
to discovery on the defendant having sought relief under Rule 16, it
might be argued that by his own request for discovery, the defendant
has waived his right to object on constitutional grounds to the dis-
covery by the government of the documents or objects m his own
possession.
CONCLUSION
A trend toward an expanded right of discovery for defendants in
criminal cases is underway in state and federal courts. The avail-
ability of this right, together with constitutional requirements that
every accused be provided with legally trained counsel to repre-
sent him, will reduce some of the disadvantages suffered by an
indigent defendant.
It would be a favorable result to allow the defendant the right
to his confession, tangible evidence, witnesses names and addresses,
to confessions of a co-defendant and to records of prior convictions,
subject to a protective order If the prosecution has any reason to
believe that a certain counsel or a certain defendant is going to
intimidate or bribe anyone, let the prosecution appear before the
trial judge and get an order protecting it from the ordinary obli-
gation of disclosure. If disclosure were in the discretion of a judge,
there could be a lack of uniformity and a "shopping for judges.' 
0 8
People might continue their cases until certain judges who are known
to be favorable toward discovery would try the case. Actually
discretion of the trial judge has been pretty much the rule in criminal
discovery for many years with the result that m most jurisdictions
there has been no such discovery The advantages of discovery
decisively outweigh the disadvantages. In the long run, the possi-
bility of abuse of discovery, although real, should not be permitted
to condemn the entire technique itself.
DAvID DAGGETT
108. See generally Symposia, 33 F.R.D. 47, 96 (1964).
